Threats to Texas Critical Infrastructure from the Iran–U.S. War

By: Dr. Arthur Simental

May 2026

Abstract

The escalation of hostilities between the United States and Iran in 2026 has expanded the battlefield into cyberspace, global energy markets, and domestic infrastructure systems. Texas, as the epicenter of U.S. energy production and distribution, represents a high-value target for Iranian retaliation. This paper analyzes the spectrum of threats to Texas critical infrastructure, including cyberattacks, proxy and physical threats, maritime disruption, and cascading system failures. Drawing on government reports, think tank analyses, and recent threat intelligence, the study finds that asymmetric tactics—particularly cyber operations—pose the most immediate and significant risk. The paper concludes with policy recommendations aimed at strengthening resilience across public and private infrastructure sectors.

Introduction

The intensification of conflict between the United States and Iran has created a multidimensional threat environment extending beyond conventional military engagements. Historically, Iran has relied on asymmetric warfare strategies to counter technologically superior adversaries, including cyber operations, proxy forces, and economic disruption (Cordesman, 2020). In the current conflict, these strategies increasingly target critical infrastructure within the United States.

Texas is uniquely vulnerable due to its concentration of energy assets, including oil refineries, natural gas systems, liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) power grid. Disruption to these systems would have consequences not only for the state but also for national and global energy markets (Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2023).

This paper examines the primary threat vectors facing Texas infrastructure and evaluates their potential impacts within the broader context of the Iran–U.S. war.

Overview of Texas Critical Infrastructure

Texas accounts for approximately 40% of U.S. crude oil production and hosts some of the largest refining and petrochemical complexes in the world (EIA, 2023). Key infrastructure includes:

• The Houston Ship Channel, a major hub for refining and exports

• Extensive pipeline networks transporting oil and natural gas nationwide

• LNG export terminals along the Gulf Coast

• The ERCOT grid, which serves most of the state independently

  
  

The concentration and interconnectedness of these systems create both efficiencies and vulnerabilities. A disruption in one sector—such as electricity—can cascade into others, including water supply, transportation, and industrial production (U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency [CISA], 2022).

Cyber Threats to Infrastructure

Iranian Cyber Capabilities

Iran has developed significant cyber capabilities over the past decade, often targeting critical infrastructure in adversarial states. Groups linked to the Iranian government have previously conducted attacks on U.S. financial institutions and industrial control systems (FireEye, 2019).

Recent intelligence indicates an increase in cyber activity targeting U.S. infrastructure, particularly energy and water systems. These attacks often exploit vulnerabilities in industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks (CISA, 2024).

Vulnerabilities in Texas Systems

Texas infrastructure is especially susceptible due to:

• Aging hardware and legacy systems

• Decentralized ownership across private entities

• Increased digital connectivity and remote access

  
  

The 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack demonstrated how a single cyber incident can disrupt fuel supply across large regions of the United States (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2021).

Potential Impacts

Cyberattacks could lead to:

• Widespread power outages

• Shutdown of refineries or pipelines

• Disruption of fuel distribution

  
  

Given Texas’s central role in energy production, these effects could propagate nationally, impacting transportation, manufacturing, and defense operations.

Physical and Proxy Threats

Direct Military Limitations

Iran lacks the capability to conduct large-scale conventional strikes on the U.S. mainland. However, its reliance on asymmetric tactics compensates for this limitation (Cordesman, 2020).

Drone and Proxy Operations

Iran has demonstrated extensive use of drones and proxy forces in conflicts across the Middle East. These tactics could be adapted to target infrastructure in the United States through:

• Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) attacks

• Sabotage by affiliated actors

• Covert operations targeting vulnerable facilities

  
  

Critical sites such as refineries, substations, and LNG terminals are particularly exposed due to their geographic spread and limited physical security.

Energy Supply Chain Disruptions

Global Context

The Iran–U.S. conflict has heightened tensions in key energy chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of global oil supply passes (EIA, 2022).

Implications for Texas

Texas infrastructure is deeply integrated into global markets. Disruptions may include:

• Reduced availability of imported inputs

• Export delays due to maritime insecurity

• Price volatility affecting production and distribution

  
  

These economic disruptions can indirectly strain infrastructure systems by increasing operational stress and reducing investment in maintenance and security.

Maritime and Port Vulnerabilities

Texas ports, including Houston and Corpus Christi, are essential for energy exports. These facilities face multiple threat vectors:

• Cyberattacks on port logistics systems

• GPS spoofing affecting maritime navigation

• Attacks on vessels or port infrastructure

  
  

Iran has previously engaged in maritime disruption tactics, suggesting a willingness to target shipping and trade routes as part of broader conflict strategies (International Maritime Organization [IMO], 2021).

Cascading Infrastructure Failures

Modern infrastructure systems are highly interconnected. Disruptions can cascade across sectors:

• Power outages affecting water treatment facilities

• Fuel shortages disrupting transportation networks

• Communication failures hindering emergency response

  
  

Research indicates that coordinated attacks on energy systems could result in economic losses exceeding hundreds of billions of dollars (CISA, 2022).

Texas’s scale and centrality amplify the potential for nationwide cascading effects.

Domestic Security and Insider Threats

The risk of insider threats is heightened in large, decentralized infrastructure systems. Employees or contractors with access to sensitive systems may be exploited by adversaries.

Additionally, pro-Iranian hacktivist groups and loosely affiliated actors may conduct low-level attacks, increasing overall system strain and complicating attribution (DHS, 2022).

Policy Implications and Recommendations

To address these threats, several policy measures are recommended:

1. Strengthen Cybersecurity Standards

   Implement mandatory security frameworks for ICS and SCADA systems.

2. Enhance Public-Private Collaboration

   Improve information sharing between government agencies and private operators.

3. Invest in Infrastructure Resilience

   Modernize aging systems and incorporate redundancy.

4. Expand Counter-UAS Capabilities

   Deploy systems to detect and neutralize drone threats.

5. Develop Rapid Response Mechanisms

   Improve coordination for incident response and recovery.

   
   

Conclusion

The Iran–U.S. war has significantly increased the risk to critical infrastructure within the United States, particularly in Texas. While direct military attacks remain unlikely, asymmetric strategies—especially cyber operations and proxy activities—pose credible and immediate threats.

Texas’s role as the backbone of U.S. energy production makes it a strategic target with global implications. Strengthening resilience across infrastructure systems is essential to mitigating these risks and ensuring national security in an era of hybrid warfare.

References

Cordesman, A. H. (2020). Iran and the changing character of war. Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022). Critical infrastructure resilience report. U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2024). Advisory on Iranian cyber activity targeting critical infrastructure. U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Department of Homeland Security. (2021). Colonial Pipeline cybersecurity incident overview. DHS.

Department of Homeland Security. (2022). National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin. DHS.

Energy Information Administration. (2022). World oil transit chokepoints. U.S. Department of Energy.

Energy Information Administration. (2023). Texas state energy profile. U.S. Department of Energy.

FireEye. (2019). Iranian cyber threat overview. FireEye Threat Intelligence.

International Maritime Organization. (2021). Maritime security and disruption risks report. IMO.