The Cyber-Physical Risk of Modern Printing: From Data Leaks to 3D Sabotage

By: Julia Chialastri

May 2026

Printers occupy an unusual place in our relationship with technology: essential, networked, and occasionally irritating, yet rarely examined too closely. Modern printers store sensitive data, run embedded operating systems, and maintain constant network connectivity, yet are overlooked when it comes to inclusion in security and cybersecurity programs.

These risks are especially acute in critical infrastructure sectors, including healthcare, utilities and municipal systems. In these environments, printers handle regulated data and operate under strict uptime requirements that inadvertently discourage patching of configuration changes. Emerging technologies, specifically 3D printers, further expand the threat landscape, by bridging the gap between digital vulnerabilities and physical sabotage. Fortunately, many printer risks can be mitigated through low- cost control, making this a high impact area for improving organizational resilience.

Standard Printer Vulnerabilities

Modern enterprise printers’ function more like specialized computers than traditional peripherals.  Many run embedded operating systems, store data locally, connect to secured enterprise networks, and incorporate advanced capabilities such as machine-learning. While these innovations improve functionality, they also significantly expand the printer attack surface. A few of the major standard printer concerns are discussed below:

Default Password/Credentials

Many printers ship with default passwords that are documented in public manuals.[1]  Attacks simply need to determine what the model of printer is, look up the corresponding manual on the manufacturer’s website, and enter default passwords to access secure networks. Manufacturers have attempted to randomize administrative passwords, but research has demonstrated that these credentials are sometimes derived from predicable inputs, such as serial numbers combined with decipherable algorithms.[2]  Many Wi-Fi printers broad cast their model name and number as their default name on networks, so locating the model name can be as simple as scanning what networks are available. As a result, poorly secured printers can provide an easy entry point for attackers into otherwise protected systems.

Unsecured Ports & Services

Printers frequently expose unnecessary or insecure network services. Once a printer is compromised, it can serve as a beachhead for lateral network movement, potentially allowing attackers to pivot into more sensitive areas of a flat or poorly segmented network.[3]

Uncontrolled Print Jobs

In shared office space, unclaimed print jobs represent a major data leakage risk. Physical documents left on trays can lead to compliance violations, particularly under HIPPA, GDPR and PCI-DSS. [4] [5]  

Decommissioned Hardware

Printers contain internal storage that caches scanned images and printer jobs. If these devices are retired or returned to a leaser without secure data destruction, sensitive organizational data remains recoverable on the hardware.[6] [7] [8]

Legacy Protocols and Unsupported Devices

Many older models rely on unencrypted or deprecated protocols, such as SMBv1 or raw TCP printing. [9] [10] These devices are often kept in service due to operational inertia, despite being past the point of receiving security patch updates.

Organizational Ownership Ambiguity

The silo effect is a major risk amplifier for printers. When facilities handle the physical hardware and IT handles the network, security updates can be left uninstalled.

3-D Printer Considerations

3-D printers have a smaller user base than standard printers, but their risk profile significantly higher due to both their use in rapid-prototyping and physical nature of their output. In CI sectors like manufacturing, technology, aerospace and healthcare, a 3D printer poses both an intellectual theft risk, and potential safety hazard. Threats to 3D printers are evolving, but a few of the emerging areas are discussed below:

Intellectual Property (IP) Theft

3D print files (CAD/STL) are vital to modern manufacturing. Intercepting these files during transmission could allow for the theft of proprietary designs. [11]

Physical Sabotage

An attacker who gains access to a 3D printers “slicer” software or firmware could introduce an imperceptible defect into a print or modify parameters to intentionally waste expensive printer materials. For critical parts, such as a valve for a utility or a medical implant, these intentional flaws could lead to a catastrophic structural failure.

Unsolicited File Execution

As CI facilities move towards rapid part production, the 3D printers becomes a vital link in the supply chain. 2024 Anycubic incident proved that internet-connected 3D printers are vulnerable to unsolicited file execution, highlighting a clear path for malicious actors to waste resources or damage equipment remotely.[12] [13]

VII. Security Controls for Printers

Many of the security issues plaguing printers can be addressed with minimal time and cost. Individual use cases should be discussed with IT teams, but a few common prevention controls are discussed below.

Control 1: Secure Configurations

Description: Disable unused services and ports, change default passwords and WIFI direct credentials, enforce HTTPS and encrypted print protocols.

Why it works: Decrease attack surfaces and eliminate common exploits.

Cost: $(low): Staff time or vendor assisted with configurations.

Control 2: Secure Printing with Role-Based Queues

Description: Require user authentication to release print jobs from device.

Why it works: Prevents unclaimed documents from being removed, and accidental disclosure in shared office spaces.

Cost: $$-$$$ Medium to High: May require printer firmware updates, new badge readers to be installed, or print management software.

Control 3: Network Segmentation + Vendor SLAs

Description: Isolate printers on dedicated VLANs, restrict east to west traffic, and enforce vendor SLAs for firmware and security notifications.

Why it works: Limits potential lateral network movement and helps to ensure that vulnerabilities are identified and patches installed in a timely manner. 

Cost: $$ Medium. Network configuration effort and vendor management overhead.

Control 4: Secure Printer Decommissioning

Description: Remove and destroy printer hard drives when possible; otherwise perform secure erase compliant with DoD 5220.22-M or equivalent.

Why it works: Ensure stored documents cannot be recovered after device retirement. 

Cost: $ - $$ Low to Medium. Secure hardware disposal or certified data destruction services. 

Control 5: 3D Printer Safety & Digital File Controls

Description: Encrypt print files, use "air-gapped" slicing stations for sensitive parts and monitor for unauthorized firmware updates.

Why it works: Help prevent unsafe prints, intellectual property loss, and misuse of devices.

Cost: $$ Medium: Policy enforcement, access control, and operator training.

Printers are an often-forgotten endpoints of organizations, yet they represent a unique intersection of cyber and physical risk. In the CI context, and unsecure printer is more than a technical nuisance, it is a potential backdoor for espionage and a tool for physical sabotage.

The path to resilience does not require a massive capital investment. By resolving organizational ambiguity, ensuring a partnership between IT and facilities, and implementing cyber hygiene like network segmentation and secure printing, Texas CI facilities can harden their perimeter. Securing the often-ignored devices on your network is an effective way to meaningfully reduce cyber risk.

Sources

Alkhadhr, S. B., and M. A. Alkandari. 2017. "Cryptography and Randomization to Dispose of Data and Boost System Security." Cogent Engineering 4 (1): 1300049. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311916.2017.1300049.

Anand, A., J. G. Bernard, and S. L. Higgins. 2022. "Human Factors in Electronic Health Records Cybersecurity Breach: An Exploratory Analysis." Journal of Medical Internet Research.

Anycubic. n.d. "Shop 3D Printers & Filaments Online: Anycubic Global Store." Accessed May 13, 2026. https://store.anycubic.com/.

Fewer, Stephen. 2025. "Multiple Brother Devices: Multiple Vulnerabilities (FIXED)." Rapid7 Blog, June 25, 2025. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/multiple-brother-devices-multiple-vulnerabilities-fixed/.

Franzen, F., L. Steger, J. Zirngibl, and P. Sattler. 2022. "Looking for Honey Once Again: Detecting RDP and SMB Honeypots on the Internet." In 2022 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW), 266–277. https://doi.org/10.1109/eurospw55150.2022.00033.

George, A. S. 2026. Cyber Resilience in an AI-Driven World. Partners Universal Innovative Research Publication (PUIRP).

Harper, Christopher. 2024. "Anycubic 3D Printers Hacked in Bold Attempt to Inform Owners of Security Hole." Tom’s Hardware, February 29, 2024. https://www.tomshardware.com/3d-printing/anycubic-3d-printers-hacked-in-bold-attempt-to-inform-owners-of-security-hole.

Muller, J., V. Mladenov, J. Somorovsky, and J. Schwenk. 2017. "SoK: Exploiting Network Printers." In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 213–230. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2017.47.

OWASP. 2023. "INT07:2023 – Insecure Passwords and Default Credentials." OWASP Top 10 Infrastructure Security Risks. Accessed May 13, 2026. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-infrastructure-security-risks/docs/2023/INT07_2023-Insecure_Passwords_and_Default_Credentials.

Pharos. n.d. "Printers and Cybersecurity Risks." Accessed May 13, 2026. https://www.pharos.com/pillar-page/printers-cybersecurity/.

Smiliotopoulos, C., G. Kambourakis, and C. Kolias. 2024. "Detecting Lateral Movement: A Systematic Survey." Heliyon 10 (5): e26317. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26317.

Sturm, L. D., C. B. Williams, J. A. Camelio, J. White, and R. Robert. 2014. "Cyber-physical Vulnerabilities in Additive Manufacturing Systems." Business Horizons 57 (5): 621–632. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2014.06.005.

Valai Ganesh, S., V. Suresh, S. Rajakarunakaran, et al. 2025. "Sustainable Electronic Waste Management Framework for Academic Institutions in India." Scientific Reports 15: 40550. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-24278-z.

[1] OWASP, “INT07:2023 – Insecure Passwords and Default Credentials,” OWASP Top 10 Infrastructure Security Risks, 2023, accessed May 13, 2026, https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-infrastructure-security-risks/docs/2023/INT07_2023-Insecure_Passwords_and_Default_Credentials.

[2] Stephen Fewer, “Multiple Brother Devices: Multiple Vulnerabilities (FIXED),” Rapid7 Blog, June 25, 2025, https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/multiple-brother-devices-multiple-vulnerabilities-fixed/.

[3] George, A. S. (2026). Cyber resilience in an AI-driven world. Partners Universal Innovative Research Publication (PUIRP).

[4] Anand, A., Bernard, J. G., & Higgins, S. L. (2022). Human Factors in Electronic Health Records Cybersecurity Breach: An Exploratory Analysis. Journal of Medical Internet Research.

[5] Pharos, “Printers and Cybersecurity Risks,” Pharos, accessed May 13, 2026, https://www.pharos.com/pillar-page/printers-cybersecurity/.

[6] Valai Ganesh, S., Suresh, V., Rajakarunakaran, S. et al. Sustainable electronic waste management framework for academic institutions in India. Sci Rep 15, 40550 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-24278-z

[7] Smiliotopoulos, C., Kambourakis, G., & Kolias, C. (2024). Detecting lateral movement: A systematic survey. Heliyon, 10(5), e26317. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26317

[8] Alkhadhr, S. B., & Alkandari, M. A. (2017). Cryptography and randomization to dispose of data and boost system security. Cogent Engineering, 4(1), 1300049. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311916.2017.1300049

[9] Franzen, F., Steger, L., Zirngibl, J., & Sattler, P. (2022). Looking for honey once again: Detecting RDP and SMB honeypots on the internet. 2022 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW), 266–277. https://doi.org/10.1109/eurospw55150.2022.00033 Cited by: 17

[10] Muller, J., Mladenov, V., Somorovsky, J., & Schwenk, J. (2017). SoK: Exploiting network printers. 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 213–230. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2017.47 Cited by: 53

[11] Sturm, L. D., Williams, C. B., Camelio, J. A., White, J., & Robert, R. (2014). Cyber-physical vulnerabilities in additive manufacturing systems. Business Horizons, 57(5), 621–632. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2014.06.005

[12] "Shop 3D Printers & Filaments Online: Anycubic Global Store," Anycubic, accessed May 13, 2026, https://store.anycubic.com/.

[13] Christopher Harper, "Anycubic 3D Printers Hacked in Bold Attempt to Inform Owners of Security Hole," Tom's Hardware, February 29, 2024, https://www.tomshardware.com/3d-printing/anycubic-3d-printers-hacked-in-bold-attempt-to-inform-owners-of-security-hole.